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Abstract
Background: Trade and investment agreements negotiated after the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) have included increasingly elevated protection of
intellectual property rights along with an expanding array of rules impacting many aspects of pharmaceutical
policy. Despite the large body of literature on intellectual property and access to affordable medicines, the ways in
which other provisions in trade agreements can affect pharmaceutical policy and, in turn, access to medicines have
been little studied. There is a need for an analytical framework covering the full range of provisions, pathways, and
potential impacts, on which to base future health and human rights impact assessment and research. A framework
exploring the ways in which trade and investment agreements may affect pharmaceutical policy was developed,
based on an analysis of four recently negotiated regional trade agreements. First a set of core pharmaceutical
policy objectives based on international consensus was identified. A systematic comparative analysis of the publicly
available legal texts of the four agreements was undertaken, and the potential impacts of the provisions in these
agreements on the core pharmaceutical policy objectives were traced through an analysis of possible pathways.
Results: An analytical framework is presented, linking ten types of provisions in the four trade agreements to potential
impacts on four core pharmaceutical policy objectives (access and affordability; safety, efficacy, and quality; rational use
of medicines; and local production capacity and health security) via various pathways.
Conclusions: The analytical framework highlights provisions in trade and investment agreements that need to be
examined, pathways that should be explored, and potential impacts that should be taken into consideration with
respect to pharmaceutical policy. This may serve as a useful checklist or template for health and human rights impact
assessments and research on the implications of trade agreements for pharmaceuticals.
Keywords: Trade agreements, Access to medicines, Pharmaceutical policy, Pharmaceuticals, Trans-Pacific Partnership,
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership, Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement, CPTPP, TPP-11, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, TRIPS
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Background
Over two decades ago, the 1995 World Trade Organiza-
tion’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) set minimum glo-
bal standards for intellectual property rights that included
committing members to providing patent terms of at least
20 years for pharmaceuticals (initiated from the date of
filing) [1, 2].1 Since this time, subsequent bilateral and
regional trade agreements, particularly those negotiated by
the USA and the EU (where most of the global research-
based pharmaceutical industry is headquartered), have
progressively expanded and extended intellectual property
(IP) protection beyond the requirements of TRIPS
through a multitude of additional provisions: the “TRIPS-
Plus” protections [1–3].
There is a large body of literature analyzing the poten-
tial negative effects of intellectual property rules incor-
porated in various trade agreements on access to
medicines, and how these rules operate (see, for ex-
ample, [1, 4–6]). A handful of empirical studies have de-
bated the effects on the timing of generic market entry,
medicine prices or expenditure, or access to medicines
(see, for example, [7–11]).
Trade agreements also include provisions, beyond IP,
that can impact on pharmaceutical policy and practice.
For example, US trade agreements with Australia and
Korea have included provisions applying to national
pharmaceutical coverage programs and regulation of
pharmaceutical marketing [3], and similar rules subse-
quently appeared in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP) [12] and the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA) [13]. The TPP also
included a set of novel provisions focused on the
assessment of safety and efficacy [14], which were sub-
sequently incorporated in the USMCA [13]. These pro-
visions have been less extensively explored. Given the
sheer scope and breadth of the legal rules negotiated in
recent trade agreements, there is an increasing number
of potential intersections between trade and investment
rules and pharmaceutical policy, going beyond the
familiar territory of IP and access to medicines, with a
range of implications for UN Sustainable Development
Goal (SDG) 3.8 (“Achieve universal health coverage,
including financial risk protection, access to quality es-
sential health-care services and access to safe, effective,
quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines
for all”) [15]. Many provisions now commonly included
in trade agreements can impinge on access to safe, ef-
fective, quality and affordable medicines, potentially
undermining the achievement of universal health cover-
age and the SDGs.
Thus, a more comprehensive understanding of the
potential points of intersection and impacts of trade
agreements on national pharmaceutical policy is
needed, to inform health and human rights impact as-
sessments2 of trade agreements under negotiation (to
the extent that negotiating texts are made public or
leaked) or to be undertaken in the future, and research
into their effects following implementation. This paper
aims to help fill this gap by identifying the provisions in
recently negotiated regional trade and investment
agreements that are relevant to pharmaceutical policy
and practice, tracing the pathways through which they
can affect pharmaceutical policy objectives (how they
may interact with pharmaceutical policy to produce im-
pacts on specific pharmaceutical policy objectives), and
developing a framework for analyzing the impact of
trade and investment agreements on pharmaceutical
policy and access to medicines.
Methods
The first step in developing the analytical framework in-
volved identifying a set of core pharmaceutical policy
objectives on which there is international consensus, or
which have been commonly adopted in pharmaceutical
policy: (i) access and affordability; (ii) safety, efficacy,
and quality; (iii) rational use of medicines, and (iv) local
production capacity and health security. These objec-
tives, initially identified by the first author and then dis-
cussed and agreed among all authors, were based on
SDG 3.8 [15] and on the WHO advice to member states
on how to develop and implement a pharmaceutical pol-
icy [17]. SDG 3.8 emphasizes the need for “access to
safe, effective, quality and affordable medicines” in order
to achieve universal health coverage [15]. The WHO ad-
vice on “general objectives of a national drug policy” in-
cludes access (understood as “equitable availability and
affordability of essential drugs”); quality, safety, and effi-
cacy; and rational use of medicines [17]. Strengthening
“national pharmaceutical production capacity” is also
recognized as a legitimate national drug policy goal for
some countries [17]. It is important to note that there
can be tensions between these policy objectives that re-
quire careful negotiation in a nation’s pharmaceutical
1The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) involving
Canada, Mexico and the United States, which came into effect on 01
January 1994, also contributed to a new global standard for IP and
became a model for subsequent US trade agreements.
2Health impact assessment (HIA) and human rights impact assessment
(HRIA) are two related but distinct approaches which can be used to
assess the potential or actual impacts of trade agreements. Methods
follow similar steps, but HIA identifies impacts on health, including
distributional impacts, whereas HRIA explicitly references potential
impacts to states’ legal obligations with respect to the Right to Health.
[16]. Gleeson D, Forman L. Implications of trade and investment
agreements for access to affordable medicines and the right to health.
Canadian Yearbook of Human Rights, In Press.
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policy: for example, affordability must be balanced with
the need to ensure safety and efficacy, and local prod-
uction must be carefully balanced with affordability.
However, a 2011 WHO report on local production con-
cluded that local production is one means by which gov-
ernments in developing countries can maintain a
balance between the availability of quality products and
meeting priority public health needs with products that
are acceptable and affordable [18].
Next, we undertook a systematic, comparative analysis
of the legal texts of four recently concluded trade and
investment agreements in order to identify a compre-
hensive set of provisions relevant to pharmaceuticals.
The agreements selected were:
 the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) [12],
negotiated among twelve countries and signed in
February 2016, but stalled since the US withdrawal
in January 2017.
 the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP-11) [19];
the agreement that was salvaged from the TPP by
the remaining 11 countries. This incorporates most
of the legal text from the TPP, but with certain pro-
visions suspended. It was signed in March 2018 and
came into force for the first six countries to
complete their domestic approval processes
(Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand,
and Singapore) in December 2018, and for Vietnam
in January 2019.3
 the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) [20] between the EU and Canada, which
was signed in October 2016 and provisionally
entered into force in September 2017.
 the US-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA) [13],
signed in November 2018 but not yet in force at the
time of writing.
These four agreements were selected because they are
large regional trade agreements for which negotiations
concluded within the past 3 years and for which final
legal texts are publicly available. Together they represent
the likely direction of binding rules affecting pharma-
ceutical policy in future agreements.
The publicly available legal texts of the agreements, in-
cluding annexes and side instruments,4 were sourced from
government websites (primarily the New Zealand Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Global Affairs Canada, and
the Office of the United States Trade Representative).5 The
contents of all text potentially relevant to pharmaceuticals
was scanned to identify relevant provisions; next, relevant
chapters, annexes, and side instruments were selected for
closer study. The selection process was undertaken inde-
pendently by the lead and second author, and discrepancies
resolved through discussion. Provisions with potential im-
plications for pharmaceuticals were organized into categor-
ies according to how they affect pharmaceutical policy;
then mapped across the agreements and important differ-
ences noted.6 Relevant chapters, annexes, and side instru-
ments in each category were analyzed independently by the
lead author and another member of the research team, and
discrepancies resolved through discussion. For the purpose
of constructing the analytical framework, comparison of
the texts of the four agreements focused on identifying pro-
visions that could have a novel or incremental impact on
pharmaceutical policy as compared to the other agree-
ments. Major reversals in trends (such as suspension of cer-
tain provisions in the CPTPP) were also noted.
The final step involved tracing the potential impact of
the provisions identified in the agreements on the core
pharmaceutical policy objectives (as noted above) through
an analysis of possible pathways, drawing on the authors’
disciplinary expertise and research experience in the field
of trade agreements and pharmaceutical policy, and on
published research evidence (where available and rele-
vant). The aim here was to identify possible pathways and
potential impacts that should be the focus of health and
human rights impact assessments and scholarly research.
Results
We identified ten types of provisions in our data set of
trade agreements that could impact on domestic pharma-
ceutical policy and regulation:
3It will come into force for the remaining five countries as their
domestic approval processes are completed.
4Side instruments from the TPP were not included in the analysis,
except for those which have been incorporated into the CPTPP (as
many of the original side instruments became defunct or were
superseded and are no longer publicly available).
5Although the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is
the official repository of the TPP and CPTPP documents, some CPTPP
side instruments not relevant to New Zealand were not located there
and were sourced from governmental websites of other CPTPP Parties.
6Chapters that form part of the architecture of the agreement but
which would not be expected to have an impact on pharmaceutical
policy independently of other parts of the text were not included in
the framework. These include dispute settlement chapters and
exceptions chapters. Each agreement incorporates the Article XX(b)
health exception from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT XX(b)) and applies it to the obligations in a limited subset of
chapters. GATT XX(b) can be invoked by Parties who wish to defend
a measure that would otherwise be in breach of the agreement as
‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’, as long as
they can show that the measure ‘does not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade’. The likelihood that a health measure will be determined by a
dispute settlement panel not to be in breach of an agreement when the
GATT XX(b) exception is invoked is difficult to predict and depends
on the specifics of the measure and its application and context.
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1. TRIPS-Plus intellectual property protections;
2. Investment protections, including investor-state
dispute settlement;
3. Procedural requirements for pharmaceutical pricing
and reimbursement programs;
4. Provisions with implications for regulation of
pharmaceutical marketing;
5. Regulatory requirements for assessment of safety,
efficacy, and quality;
6. Reduction/elimination of tariffs on medicines or
their ingredients;
7. Rules applying to government procurement of
pharmaceuticals;
8. Rules applying to state-owned enterprises and
designated monopolies;
9. Procedural requirements for customs
administration and trade facilitation; and
10. Rules applying to regulatory practices, cooperation
and coherence.
The pathways through which these provisions could im-
pact on pharmaceutical policy are summarized in Table 1
and explained in each of the sections below. Additional file 1
provides a detailed breakdown of the chapters, annexes,
and side instruments in which relevant provisions were
found, organized by the ten types of provisions.
TRIPS-plus intellectual property (IP) protections
Each of the four agreements (TPP, CPTPP, CETA,
USMCA) contains IP chapters that include TRIPS-Plus
IP provisions which, depending on a country’s existing
IP laws and pharmaceutical policies, could delay generic
competition and potentially impact negatively on access
to medicines.7 For example, each of these agreements
includes patent term adjustments and data protection
for new pharmaceutical products. The types of TRIPS-
Plus provisions common in these agreements and the
ways in which they serve to prolong exclusivity and
delay generic competition are summarized in Table 2
below. Additional file 2 provides the article/section
numbers for the relevant IP provisions found in each
agreement.
Agreements have varied as to the patterns of
TRIPS-Plus IP provisions they include. The TPP
included each of the TRIPS-Plus provisions indicated
in Table 2 [23], though many of these were sus-
pended in the CPTPP following the US withdrawal
[24], including the requirement to provide patents
for new uses, methods and processes of using exist-
ing products, and the provisions providing for patent
term adjustments and data/market protection (see
Additional file 2 for details). Patent linkage, trade
secrets protection, and TRIPS-Plus enforcement pro-
visions, however, were retained in the revived
agreement.
The USMCA IP chapter is closely based on the corre-
sponding chapter of the TPP, but includes 10 years of
“effective market protection” for biologics, longer than
the period negotiated in the TPP [25]. For Canada, this
will increase the period of market protection for bio-
logics by 2 years; two studies of the potential impact on
pharmaceutical expenditure (using different methods
and based on different assumptions) have estimated the
savings foregone at between CDN$0 and $305.8 [26] and
up to CDN$169 by 2029 [27]. The USMCA also includes
a broader definition of biologics, potentially expanding
the array of drugs which will be eligible for this longer
period of exclusivity [25].
Overall, CETA contains fewer TRIPS-Plus provisions
than the TPP or USMCA, but it provides for a longer
data/market protection period for new pharmaceutical
products than the TPP (although CETA did not ex-
tend data protection in Canada). CETA does not con-
tain special data protection or market exclusivity rules
for biologics, but the length of the data protection
period provided for all drugs under CETA is equiva-
lent to the length for biologics under the TPP in any
case. CETA does not include a provision for patent
linkage, since patent linkage is prohibited in the EU;
however CETA requires Parties that rely on patent
linkage mechanisms to provide the right of appeal to
all litigants—which effectively enables originator man-
ufacturers in Canada to slow down generic entry
through patent litigation [28].
The IP provisions in these agreements may delay
the market entry of less expensive generic and biosi-
milar medicines, keeping prices high for longer pe-
riods, in turn impacting on government expenditure
on pharmaceuticals and/or out-of-pocket costs for
consumers, depending on the health system in each
7TRIPS-Plus provisions can also impact prices and access through
other mechanisms such as restrictions on compulsory licensing and
parallel importation, restrictions on patent opposition and revocation,
limitations on exclusions from patentability, and supplementary
protection certificates. While these types of provisions have appeared
in other trade agreements (and some were originally proposed for the
TPP), none of the four agreements studied include such provisions in
the final text. Some trade agreements, including the TPP/CPTPP and
USMCA, also expect countries to be members of the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT). PCT membership is likely to increase the
volume of patent applications filed locally and, with increased
workload for examiners, perhaps the grant of patents that might
otherwise be rejected, increasing the likelihood that more drugs have
single suppliers. As all members of the agreements reviewed in this
article are already members of the PCT, this particular provision will
not change the existing situation for them (though it may restrict
options for subsequent leaders). More generally, analyses of IP
provisions in trade agreements should consider wither PCT
membership is required.
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Table 1 Summary of analytic framework linking provisions, pathways, and potential impacts
Provisions Pathways Potential impacts on core
pharmaceutical policy
objectives
TRIPS-Plus intellectual property protection • Extended periods of exclusivity for patented medicines and
obstacles to market entry for generic and biosimilar
medicines can reduce competition and lead governments
and consumers to pay monopoly prices for longer periods
of time
• Access to affordable
medicines may be reduced
Investment protection: investor-state dispute
settlement mechanism; investment chapter with IP
covered in definition of investment
• Disputes, or the threat of a dispute, may cause reversal of
pharmaceutical policy decisions or regulatory chill—
possibly resulting in extended exclusivity periods, relaxation
of regulatory standards or inability to support local
producers
• Access to affordable
medicines may be reduced
• Rational use of medicines
may be compromised
• Local production and health
security may be
compromised
Procedural requirements for national pharmaceutical
pricing and reimbursement programs
• Industry objectives and values may be given priority over
public health and access to medicines
• Pharmaceutical companies may be given additional
opportunities to provide input to, or to contest, decision-
making regarding pricing and/or reimbursement
• Flexibility regarding prioritization and timing of listing
drugs for reimbursement may decrease
• Scarce health resources may be diverted towards
implementing procedural requirements with no public
benefit
• Pharmaceutical policy-making may come under pressure
from trade partners with large pharmaceutical industries
• Excessive prices may not reflect clinical value of medicines
• Access to affordable
medicines may be reduced
• Rational use of medicines
may be compromised
Provisions with implications for regulation of
pharmaceutical marketing
• Attempts to prohibit or restrict pharmaceutical promotion
to health professionals (to encourage better prescribing) or
consumers (to encourage better use of medicines) may be
reversed or chilled
• Restrictions on pharmaceutical marketing may be difficult
to enforce (for cross-border advertising services)
• Rational use of medicines
may be compromised
Regulatory requirements for assessing safety, efficacy
and quality
• Standards may be lowered through harmonization to the
lowest common denominator, pressure from trade partners
to adopt lower standards or greater involvement of the
pharmaceutical industry in standard-setting
• Pressure to speed up regulatory approval processes may
result in increase in safety risks
• Constraints on public information about pharmaceutical
inspections may compromise safety and quality
• Cooperation on pharmaceutical inspection issues may
improve the quality of medicines thereby improving
consumer safety
• Safety, efficacy and quality of
medicines may be
compromised
• Manufacturing quality of
medicines may be lowered
or improved
Reduction/elimination of tariffs on pharmaceuticals or
their ingredients
• Prices of imported pharmaceuticals may fall, in some
circumstances (if additional mark-ups are not applied at
other points in the supply chain)
• Viability of local generic pharmaceutical industry in
question if there is greater competition—potentially
reducing supply and compromising health security
• Access to affordable
medicines may increase
• Local production and health
security may be
compromised
Rules applying to government procurement of
pharmaceuticals
• Governments/hospitals may pay lower prices as a result of
open tendering, depending on the nature of the
procurement process and institutions
• Viability of fledgling domestic pharmaceutical industries
may be reduced if government and hospital purchasing
cannot preference local suppliers
• Access to affordable
medicines may increase
• Local production and health
security may be
compromised
Rules applying to state-owned enterprises and
designated monopolies
• Viability of domestic pharmaceutical industry in developing
countries may be affected if state-owned pharmaceutical
companies are required to operate as commercial entities
and cannot be given financial support or preferential
treatment, or cannot give preference to local suppliers
• Pressure for reform of state owned enterprises may result
in greater competition and lower prices
• Local production and health
security may be
compromised, or improved
Procedural requirements for customs administration • Movement of generic pharmaceuticals across borders may • Access to affordable
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country [1–8, 29].8 They can also “lock in” high levels
of intellectual property protection, preventing or con-
straining reform, as revising trade agreements typic-
ally requires the consent of all Parties. Whether
specific provisions in specific agreements will have
these effects depends on many factors, including the
existing domestic intellectual property laws in mem-
ber countries, the details of their health and
pharmaceutical systems and markets, and decisions of
dispute resolution panels, should there be complaints.
Investment protection
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms
are included in each of the four agreements exam-
ined here. ISDS provides an avenue for foreign
investors, including pharmaceutical companies, to
Table 2 Types of TRIPS-Plus IP provisions common in recent regional trade agreements
Type of provision Mechanism for prolonging exclusivity
Requirement to grant patents for new uses of known products, new
methods of using known products, or new processes of using known
products
Enables firms to obtain additional patent protection for new forms or
uses of existing products, which may reduce the use of equivalent
versions after the expiry of primary patents on original molecules.
Patent term adjustments to compensate for delays in granting patents
and/or in marketing approval processes
Extends the length of patent terms.
Data protection for new pharmaceutical products including biologics (an
alternative pathway for maintaining monopoly control based on the
clinical trial data submitted to regulators in order to gain marketing
approval)
Can add to the length of exclusivity if the period of data protection
extends beyond the expiration of relevant patents.
Can provide monopoly protection for drugs or biologics that are not
protected by patents (e.g., where a drug or biologic is not eligible for a
patent or where the key patent has been invalidated).
Provides a time-limited but absolute monopoly which cannot be
challenged in court (as in the case of a patent) and may prevent or delay
marketing approval of generics produced under a compulsory or
government use license.
Additional data protection for new indications/formulations/methods of
administration or for combination products containing a chemical entity
that has not previously been approved
New and/or longer periods of data protection or market exclusivity for
biologic products;a
Patent linkage mechanisms (linking patent status with marketing approval
of generics);
Can extend periods of exclusivity if marketing approval is denied due to
patents of questionable validity, patents that are not being infringed by
the generic product or patents for changes that have no direct
therapeutic applications.
Trade secrets protection Unlike a patent, trade secret protection does not provide a time-limited
monopoly, so it can potentially exclude competition indefinitely.b
TRIPS-Plus provisions for the enforcement of intellectual property rights Strict enforcement of, and penalties for, suspected violations of
intellectual property rights, including seizure of suspected counterfeit
goods at the border (i.e., goods suspected of violating IP rules rather
than being of deliberately inferior quality), excessive damages, provisional
measures, and criminal enforcement of patent infringement.
aBiologic products are a new class of medicines which are derived from living cells using biotechnological processes and that need to be delivered by injection or
intravenously. These include many expensive treatments for cancer and autoimmune diseases, and account for a growing share of the global pharmaceutical
market and of pharmaceutical expenditure in many countries. [21]. IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics. The Global Use of Medicines: Outlook through 2017.
IMS Health, 2013
bProtection of trade secrets is likely to play an increasing role in excluding competition due to the growing dominance of biologics and the emergence of
personalized medicine. The manufacturing processes for developing these newer treatments are very complex, and may make it essentially impossible to create a
biosimilar that is identical to the reference product. [22]. Lyman GH, Zon R, Harvey RD, Schilsky RL. Rationale, opportunities, and reality of biosimilar medications.
New England Journal of Medicine 2018;378:2036–2044
Table 1 Summary of analytic framework linking provisions, pathways, and potential impacts (Continued)
Provisions Pathways Potential impacts on core
pharmaceutical policy
objectives
and trade facilitation be impeded, or facilitated, in cases of suspected breaches
of IP laws
medicines may be reduced,
or improved
Rules applying to regulatory practices, cooperation
and coherence
• Pharmaceutical industry may have additional levers to
provide input to, or contest pharmaceutical policy
• Potential for industry representation on or input to expert
advisory groups may compromise optimal pharmaceutical
policy outcomes
• Access to affordable
medicines may be reduced
• Safety, efficacy and quality of
medicines may be
compromised
• Rational use of medicines
may be compromised
• Local production and health
security may be
compromised
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contest the policies, decisions, and laws of govern-
ments, by bringing a claim for compensation to an
international arbitral tribunal, arguing that their in-
vestor rights under the agreement have been brea-
ched. Notably, after a three-year window (during
which any claims filed will proceed under the old
NAFTA provisions), the USMCA provides for ISDS
only between the USA and Mexico; moreover, the
grounds on which a claim may be brought are sig-
nificantly narrowed in comparison with the other
agreements and do not apply to pharmaceuticals.
CETA’s ISDS provisions have been suspended until/
unless they are approved by each EU member state.
After CETA was signed, its ISDS rules were also
substantially revised, calling for the creation of an
“Investment Court System” with professional and in-
dependent judges (rather than temporary tribunals),
opening up hearings to the public, and publishing
documents submitted during cases.
ISDS has become highly controversial due to the
rising number of cases, including several high-profile
cases over environmental and public health policies
[33]. One such case was a claim for hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in compensation by the tobacco giant
Philip Morris against the Government of Australia
over its tobacco plain packaging laws [34].9 Because
of this controversy, recently negotiated investment
chapters (e.g., TPP Chapter 9) have included clauses
aimed at reducing the likelihood of investors winning
cases against legitimate, non-discriminatory health mea-
sures. Many of these clauses are yet untested and some
legal scholars have expressed doubts over the degree to
which such putative safeguards will assist countries to
defend claims against health and environmental policies
and laws [35]. In contrast, some recently concluded bilat-
eral trade agreements have explicitly excluded public
health measures and/or specific health programs (see, for
example, the Peru-Australia Free Trade Agreement, chap-
ter 8, footnote 17) [36].
An ISDS claim, or the threat of one, may deter govern-
ments from enacting health and pharmaceutical policies:
an effect known as “regulatory chill.” This occurs partly
due to the prohibitive costs associated with ISDS. The
Australian Government spent approximately A$23 mil-
lion defending the claim by Philip Morris Asia over to-
bacco plain packaging [37].10 If the investor wins, the
awards may also be substantial: investors initiating ISDS
claims in 2017 sought from 15 million USD to 1.5 billion
USD [38]. Considerable uncertainty attends the outcome
of ISDS claims, due to various procedural issues, includ-
ing the ad hoc nature of decisions (arbitrators are not
bound by previous tribunal decisions), the potential for
conflicts of interest among arbitrators, and the lack of
an appeals process [39, 40]. While recent agreements
such as the TPP have improved on some aspects of the
ISDS process (like the transparency of proceedings),
many procedural problems remain [40].
One area of particular concern is the use of ISDS to
enforce IP rights [40]. IP is included in the definition of
investment in each agreement (see, for example, TPP
Art 9.1). Article 9.8.5 of the TPP is aimed at excluding
compulsory licenses and the “revocation, limitation or
creation of intellectual property rights” from the scope
of ISDS as long as such actions are consistent with the
TPP IP chapter and the TRIPS Agreement [14]. But
interpreting the TRIPS Agreement outside the WTO
context is risky: ISDS panels often deliver narrow inter-
pretations that may not incorporate the full intent (or
provisions) of TRIPS [40].
The most significant example of ISDS in relation to
pharmaceuticals is a claim launched by the US pharma-
ceutical company, Eli Lilly, against the Canadian Gov-
ernment, after Canadian courts had invalidated patents
for uses of two drugs that had been found not to provide
the promised benefits [41]. Eli Lilly contested not just
the specific decisions in relation to those drugs, but also
how Canadian courts had relied on the claims made in
the patent application to assess the utility of a patent
(referred to as the promise/utility doctrine) [42]. Eli Lilly
was not successful in its ISDS challenge, but the Canad-
ian Supreme Court subsequently weakened the utility re-
quirement, reducing the amount of evidence required
for successfully defending patents—a move which some
commentators have attributed to ongoing pressure from
the USA and the pharmaceutical industry [42].
ISDS may have “chilling” effects on health policy even
when cases do not proceed to arbitration. For example,
Colombia desisted from issuing a compulsory license for
imatinib (Glivec/Gleevec) after Novartis filed a notice of
8Based on our reading of the literature ([30]. Jung Y, Kwon S. The
effects of intellectual property rights on access to medicines and
catastrophic expenditure. International Journal of Health Services
2015;45:507–529; [31]. Jung Y, Kwon S. How does stronger protection
of intellectual property rights affect national pharmaceutical
expenditure? An analysis of OECD countries. International Journal of
Health Services 2018;48:685–701; [32]. Park W. Intellectual property
rights and international innovation. In: Mascus K (ed). Frontiers of
economics and globalization. Elsevier Science Vol 1:289–327.), there is
limited support for the thesis that stronger IP will lead to more
pharmaceutical innovation or better health outcomes; therefore, we
have not dealt with the possibility in our analysis.
9The case was found in favour of Australia, based on jurisdictional
grounds.
10Philip Morris Asia was ordered to pay a proportion of Australia’s
legal costs defending its legislation as well as 50% of Australia’s share
of the arbitration fees, leaving the country to cover A$12 million.
Gleeson et al. Globalization and Health 2019, 15(Suppl 1):78 Page 7 of 17
dispute in 2016; and Ukraine de-registered a generic
hepatitis C medicine after Gilead indicated that it would
pursue arbitration [42].
In addition to disputes over intellectual property
rights, ISDS could potentially be used to challenge or
“chill” other pharmaceutical policy decisions, such as
decisions not to approve particular drugs, conditions
for drug reimbursement by public drug plans, rules
against the promotion of off-label use, rules about
safety and inspections, or policies benefiting local pro-
ducers. Possible impacts include extended exclusivity
periods, relaxation of regulatory standards, less ra-
tional prescribing, and reduced viability of the domes-
tic pharmaceutical industry.
Procedural requirements for national pharmaceutical
pricing and reimbursement programs
Three of the four agreements contain provisions that
may impact a country’s pharmaceutical reimbursement
program. The TPP and USMCA include a near-identical
set of provisions applying to national programs for list-
ing medicines and medical devices on national formular-
ies and setting prices for reimbursement. The provisions
include a set of aspirational principles applying to sys-
tems for pharmaceuticals and medical devices, a set of
procedural rules, and the requirement to provide oppor-
tunities to consult when a written request is received
from another Party.11 The CPTPP retains the principles
and the consultation requirement from the TPP but sus-
pends its procedural rules (see Additional file 1).
The principles in TPP Annex 26-A (Art. 2) (and
retained in the CPTPP) and in USMCA Chapter 29 (Art.
29.6) are not written in treaty-level language and are not
enforceable through state-to-state dispute settlement.
The principles may, however, serve a normative purpose
by reinforcing industry values and priorities, and could
conceivably be referenced by dispute panelists in ISDS
rulings. While acknowledging the “importance of pro-
tecting and promoting public health,” the principles are
weighted towards pharmaceutical industry objectives,
using language such as “innovation associated with re-
search and development” and “the value of pharmaceut-
ical products”.
More significant are the procedural rules contained in
both the TPP (Annex 26-A, Art. 3) and USMCA (Art.
29.7). These rules, which were suspended in the CPTPP,
include requirements to: complete assessment of appli-
cations within a specified time-period, disclose “proced-
ural rules, methodologies, principles and guidelines”
used for their assessment, provide “timely” opportunities
for applicants to comment during decision-making, and
provide written information about the reasons for deci-
sions. Furthermore, countries must provide a review
process for negative listing decisions, which may be in-
voked at the request of an affected applicant.
Unless carefully managed, these rules may facilitate
industry input (and potentially interference) in decision-
making on listing and reimbursement of pharmaceuti-
cals, as well as reducing flexibility in the prioritization
and timing of listing decisions. In the event of a dispute
brought by a pharmaceutical company using the ISDS
mechanism in the TPP and CPTPP, the rules might be
used to lend weight to industry arguments, for example,
regarding the rights of investors to a minimum standard
of treatment [14]. At the very least, compliance with the
requirements entails committing resources to adminis-
tering processes that serve the interests of industry,
rather than useful public purposes.
The procedural rules in the TPP were suspended in
the CPTPP. Had they been retained, as an example of
their potential implications if introduced in future trade
agreements, New Zealand would have been required to
introduce a statutory timeframe for assessing applica-
tions for public funding and a review process for nega-
tive listing decisions—at an estimated cost of NZ $4.5
million initially and $2.2 million per year in ongoing
costs (approx. 10% of the operating costs of New Zeal-
and’s Pharmaceutical Management Agency) [43].
Currently neither Canada nor Mexico has national
reimbursement programs that will fall under the proced-
ural requirements in the USMCA12; their inclusion in
this agreement perhaps anticipates a future national
“Pharmacare” scheme in Canada. Such a scheme would
have to abide by the legally binding rules in the USMCA,
although Canada’s interpretation and implementation of
these rules would not be subject to formal dispute settle-
ment procedures.
A third set of provisions in the TPP, CPTPP, and
USMCA relevant to pharmaceutical reimbursement is
the requirement to “afford adequate opportunity” for
consultation on receipt of a written request from an-
other Party (TPP Annex 26-A, Art. 5 and USMCA Art.
29.9). However, health officials must be involved in these
consultations—which may well make it less likely that
such consultations become platforms for pharmaceutical
lobbying. The terms of reference of a medicines working
group established by similar provisions in the Australia-
US FTA were carefully circumscribed, and initial fears
about its impact on pharmaceutical policy in Australia
11While the provisions applying to pharmaceutical pricing and
reimbursement programs in the TPP/CPTPP and USMCA are
procedural in nature, it is clear that the pharmaceutical industry has
(largely unsuccessfully to date) sought to undermine price controls and
reference pricing (Lopert & Gleeson, 2013).
12The procedural requirements in TPP Annex 26-A would also not
have applied to Canada or Mexico.
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proved groundless [3, 14]. All the same, the consultation
requirement remains a risk for countries that are more
vulnerable to pressure from other Parties, or in circum-
stances where the consultation process may not be simi-
larly circumscribed.
It is important to note that, although the rules for
pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement programs
are framed in terms of transparency, and the trade
agreements studied also include other provisions of
more general application, framed in terms of promoting
transparency and anti-corruption, these appear to be
largely window-dressing. For example, they lack oper-
ational definitions of “transparency” and “corruption,”
lack effective accountability mechanisms, and largely ig-
nore the private sector. As such, these agreements are
unlikely to contribute much to promoting transparency
and anti-corruption in the pharmaceutical sector, despite
the importance of these issues.
Provisions with implications for regulation of
pharmaceutical marketing
Three of the four agreements contain specific provisions
which could affect pharmaceutical marketing rules. The
TPP includes a provision focused on digital (online)
marketing of pharmaceuticals to health professionals
and consumers (Annex 26-A Art 4). This provision was
incorporated into the CPTPP, and reproduced in almost
identical form in the USMCA (Art 29.8).
At first glance this provision appears to require coun-
tries to allow the dissemination of information to health
professionals and consumers via the internet. However,
the first part of the provision (“As is permitted to be
disseminated under the Party’s laws, regulations and
procedures”) means that countries that currently pro-
hibit or restrict these types of advertising can continue
to do so [44]. In each of the agreements, the provision
is not enforceable through state-to-state dispute settle-
ment. The provision could, however, be perceived as af-
fecting investor rights, potentially bolstering ISDS
claims over attempts to prohibit or restrict direct-to-
consumer advertising (DTCA) or marketing to health
professionals [44]. Aside from these provisions directly
targeting regulation of pharmaceutical marketing, all
four agreements also feature Cross-Border Trade in
Services chapters (CETA Chapter 9, TPP/CPTPP Chap-
ter 10 and USMCA Chapter 15) with rules that may
frustrate efforts to regulate pharmaceutical marketing,
unless Parties explicitly exclude pharmaceutical adver-
tising services from their coverage. Examples of provi-
sions include rules that prohibit restrictions on market
access, including bans and other quantitative restric-
tions (CETA Art. 9.6, TPP/CPTPP Art 10.5, USMCA
Art. 15.5), and rules that prevent Parties from requiring
that cross-border service suppliers have a local
presence (TPP/CPTPP Art 10.6, USMCA Art 15.6),
which can make regulations difficult to enforce.
The evidence base regarding DTCA of pharmaceuti-
cals is still developing, but DTCA has been shown to
stimulate demand for patented drugs (thereby increas-
ing expenditure), and to interfere with rational pre-
scribing [45]. Pharmaceutical promotion expenditure
in the USA focuses on new drugs that are likely to
generate significant returns on investment, and televi-
sion advertisements are more concerned with promo-
tion than education [46]. A recent systematic review
of the effects on prescribing when physicians receive
information directly from pharmaceutical companies
found evidence of an association with a deterioration
in prescribing appropriateness and a rise in prescrib-
ing costs and frequency [47].
Regulatory requirements for assessment of safety,
efficacy and quality
The TPP, CPTPP, and USMCA each include regulatory
requirements for assessment of safety and efficacy,
including marketing authorization and pharmaceutical
inspections. The language and presentation of these pro-
visions differ slightly between the TPP/CPTPP and
USMCA, but the content is very similar.
Both agreements include articles directed towards har-
monizing marketing authorization processes and align-
ing these with international and regional standards.
Article 7 of TPP Annex 8-C and Art. 12.F.4 of the
USMCA commit the Parties to improve the alignment
of their regulations and regulatory activities through
international initiatives, “such as those aimed at
harmonization, as well as regional initiatives that support
those international initiatives”. A further article (TPP
Annex 8-C Art. 8 and USMCA Art. 12.F.6) requires
countries to consider “relevant scientific or technical
guidance documents developed through international
collaborative efforts” and encourages them to “consider
regionally-developed scientific or technical guidance docu-
ments” that are aligned with these international efforts.
Furthermore, Article 16 of the TPP Annex 8-C and Article
12.F.6 para 10 of the USMCA require parties to review
marketing authorization applications in a format consist-
ent with the International Conference on Harmonisation
of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceu-
ticals for Human Use: Common Technical Document. Reg-
ulations for pharmaceutical inspections are also to be
based on guidance documents developed through inter-
national collaborative efforts (TPP Annex 8-C Art. 18 and
USMCA Art. 12.F.5 para 8).
Some forms of regulatory harmonization for pharma-
ceuticals can be advantageous for expediting registration
of quality medicines and improving post-market surveil-
lance and pharmaco-vigilance. It is unclear, however,
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whether the harmonization that is promoted by the pro-
visions in the TPP/CPTPP and USMCA will result in
improvements to the assessment of safety, efficacy, or
quality—it may instead serve as a means to raise barriers
in order to protect market shares and eliminate some of
the competition. The primary forum through which
harmonization in pharmaceutical regulation occurs is
the International Council for Harmonisation of Tech-
nical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
(ICH). Established in the early 1990s by industry associa-
tions and regulatory agencies in the USA, EU and Japan
(headquarters to the bulk of the world’s multinational
pharmaceutical companies), the main purpose of the
ICH is to reduce the cost of developing pharmaceuticals,
minimize regulatory requirements, and speed up market-
ing approval processes in order to promote market ac-
cess [48]. It has been criticized for focusing on industry
priorities such as promoting the economic interests of
the large multinational pharmaceutical companies at the
expense of smaller generic companies, developing
countries, and patients [49]; for driving harmonization
in a downwards direction towards the lowest common
denominator [48]; and neglecting topics that would
have clearer benefits for patient safety, such as the
registration of clinical trials, patient information leaf-
lets, and the release of information about adverse drug
reactions [48].
CETA takes a somewhat different approach, including
a Protocol on the mutual recognition of the compliance
and enforcement programme regarding good manufactur-
ing practices for pharmaceutical products, intended “to
strengthen the cooperation between the authorities of
the Parties in ensuring that medicinal products and
drugs meet appropriate quality standards through the
mutual recognition of certificates of GMP [Good Manu-
facturing Practice] compliance” (Art. 2). Depending on
how this is done, mutual recognition and cooperation
between regulatory agencies on inspection issues may
result in improvements to consumer safety.
Both the TPP and USMCA stipulate the criteria that
can be used to make marketing approval decisions with
respect to the information required for demonstrating
safety, efficacy, and quality (TPP Annex 8-C Art 11, also
incorporated into the CPTPP; USMCA Art 12.F.6). Re-
quiring sales and financial data is explicitly ruled out,
and Parties are to “endeavor” not to require pricing data
for making a marketing authorization decision. The ab-
sence of sales and financial data may not in itself present
a problem, as these are not used in making marketing ap-
proval decisions in most countries—but if the list of cri-
teria to be used is interpreted as a restrictive list, it may
also rule out the use of other types of additional criteria,
such as the “medical need” test used in Norway before it
joined the European Medicines Agency [14]. Depending
on the interpretation, these clauses might limit the levers
available to prevent predatory pricing.
TPP Annex 8-C Article 12 obliges parties to adminis-
ter marketing approval processes in a “timely, reason-
able, objective, transparent, and impartial manner;” the
USMCA includes a similar clause (Art. 12.F.6 para 4).
However, pressure to speed up regulatory approval pro-
cesses may compromise the safety of products entering
the market [14]. With new drugs approved in Canada
1995–2010, the rate of serious safety issues was higher
for drugs that had been given a priority (shorter) review
than for those subjected to a standard review [50].
Both agreements also contain provisions (TPP
Annex 8-C Art. 17 and USMCA Art. 12.F.5) regarding
pharmaceutical inspections. Prior to conducting an in-
spection on another Party’s territory, Parties are to notify
the other Party (“unless there are reasonable grounds to
believe that doing so could prejudice the effectiveness of
the inspection”), permit representatives of the other
Party’s authority to observe the inspection (where “prac-
ticable”), and notify the other Party of its findings prior
to public release, where this occurs. However, there is
no requirement for public release of the findings of in-
spections. The USMCA contains additional clauses that
promote the exchange of confidential information
between the Parties. However, as Parties must prevent
the disclosure of this confidential information, public
release of information could be constrained when an
inspection report is received from a country with more
restrictive transparency standards. While CETA (Good
Manufacturing Practices Protocol, Art. 14) and
USMCA (Art. 12.F.5 para 6) restrict disclosure of confi-
dential information only as it relates to good manufac-
turing practices, TPP and CPTPP (Art. 8.6.4) extend
these restrictions to conformity assessment, which
could also affect important safety data about pharma-
ceutical products.
A further provision, incorporated in TPP Chapter 8
and reproduced in USMCA Chapter 11, requires mem-
bers to provide opportunities for “persons of another
Party to participate in the development of technical reg-
ulations, standards and conformity assessment proce-
dures by its central government bodies on terms no less
favorable than those that it accords to its own persons”
(TPP Art. 8.7.1; USMCA Art. 11.7.1). A footnote to each
agreement allows Parties to limit this obligation to “pro-
viding interested persons a reasonable opportunity to
provide comments on the measure it proposes to de-
velop” and “taking those comments into account in the
development of the measure.” The USMCA goes further
here, with a provision requiring Parties to “allow persons
of another Party” to participate in groups or committees
that develop standards, on “no less favorable terms than
its own persons” (Article 11.7.8). These provisions might
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enable pharmaceutical industry stakeholders to influence
drug decision-making in other countries.
Reduction/elimination of tariffs on pharmaceuticals or
their ingredients
The TPP, CPTPP, and USMCA each eliminate tariffs
on medicines for some countries and/or some phar-
maceuticals. For example, Vietnam agreed to elimin-
ate tariffs on medicines over a period of 10 years for
CPTPP members [51] and Mexico’s tariff schedule for
the USMCA eliminates tariffs on some medicines, in-
cluding those based on rituximab and medicines con-
taining erythropoietin [52].
Reducing or eliminating tariffs on medicines or
their ingredients may contribute towards reducing the
cost of medicines for consumers or payers, at least
for imported medicines. This is by no means certain,
however, as additional mark-ups at other points in
the supply chain may elevate prices after the ingredi-
ent or product enters the market [53].
Some LMICs maintain tariffs on finished pharmaceut-
ical products to protect their fledgling domestic generic
manufacturers from foreign competition [54]. Local pro-
duction of pharmaceuticals in LMICs may improve ac-
cess to medicines by increasing price competition
(thereby driving down prices); ensure that the country’s
needs for specific generic medicines are met regardless
of the priorities of pharmaceutical industries in other
countries (e.g., India); and maximize efficiencies through
relationships with distribution networks [55]. Local pro-
duction can also enable redundant sources of supply to
maintain a healthy market and protect against stockouts
due to problems with production and supply [18]. Main-
taining and building a viable domestic pharmaceutical
industry also contributes to economic and development
goals [55] and may be politically important even when
not economically attractive in a static, immediate sense.
Most high-income countries have already eliminated
tariffs on medicines, whether unilaterally or through
reciprocal arrangements under the WTO GATT 1994
Communication on Trade in Pharmaceutical Products
[54, 56], and tariffs on pharmaceuticals maintained by
LMICs have been gradually falling [54]. A few coun-
tries (including India) continue to apply relatively
high tariffs [53], however. The proportion of global
pharmaceutical trade involving countries that continue
to maintain tariffs increased between 2006 and 2013,
meaning that a growing proportion of pharmaceutical
trade is subject to tariffs [53]. In this context, newer
trade agreements may still play a significant role in
reducing tariffs on medicines.
While the elimination of pharmaceutical tariffs in the
context of multilateral trade relations is generally deemed
advantageous for access to medicines, the effects of
preferential trade agreements are less clear, because of
several complexities. Much depends on how the pharma-
ceutical market is structured domestically. Over-reliance
on imports of pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical inputs
from certain markets may create vulnerabilities if there is
instability in the market, as well as the potential for nega-
tive impacts on the domestic pharmaceutical sector [57].
The appropriate balance between importing pharmaceu-
ticals and local production is country-specific: in some
cases, importation may be more effective financially. How-
ever, in some contexts, tariffs may serve as important tools
for navigating the tensions between the objectives of af-
fordability and the benefits of local production. Agreeing
to binding commitments in trade agreements may involve
sacrificing some policy flexibility in making adjustments
or trade-offs, in order to maximize benefits.
Rules applying to government procurement of
pharmaceuticals
The TPP, CETA, and USMCA each contain government
procurement chapters. The purpose of these chapters is
to ensure that governments or government entities pur-
chasing goods and services (above certain monetary
thresholds) do not discriminate against suppliers from
another Party, or against local suppliers that are affiliated
with or owned by foreign entities from another Party, or
that provide goods and services from another Party.
The TPP Government Procurement Chapter (Ch. 15),
retained almost entirely in the CPTPP [19],13 is based
closely on the rules contained in the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement (GPA). However, only a few
TPP countries are currently members of the GPA,14 and
procurement markets in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei
have been mostly closed to date [58]. However, these
countries have long transition periods for implementing
the CPTPP government procurement obligations.
The rules of TPP/CPTPP Chapter 15 apply, for the most
part, only to those entities listed in a series of annexes. For
most countries, the rules apply to all goods and services
except those that are specifically excluded. All TPP parties
appear to have made commitments to allow suppliers
from other TPP parties to bid for pharmaceutical govern-
ment procurement contracts at the national or subna-
tional level, or both [59]. However, determining how
much of a particular country’s pharmaceutical procure-
ment is covered would require a detailed analysis of all
14While nearly all WTO agreements are binding on all members, the
GPA is an exception to the “single undertaking,” a plurilateral
agreement within the WTO that countries may decide to join, or not.
13Two provisions in the Government Procurement Chapter are
suspended by CPTPP Annex Paragraph 6. These provisions concern
labor rights and the timing of further negotiations on government
procurement.
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institutions involved in purchasing pharmaceuticals in
each country. Commitments have also been made on gov-
ernment purchasing by health ministries, including pur-
chasing by public hospitals (Malaysia) and 34 state-owned
hospitals (Vietnam) [59]. Vietnam’s liberalization of gov-
ernment procurement of pharmaceutical products is to be
phased in gradually over 16 years, and is to cover only
50% of the contract value for pharmaceutical products at
the end of that time [60]. Governments, however, also es-
tablish thresholds below which there is no obligation to
liberalize a procurement contract. These specifications by
different Parties make it difficult to draw general conclu-
sions as to whether liberalized tendering, when the con-
tract is large enough to cross the threshold, will assist in
lowering drug costs (through competitive pricing) or will,
over time, increase drug costs (by forcing initially less
competitive suppliers out of the market and contributing
to an eventual monopoly) [57].
The CETA Government Procurement Chapter (Ch.19)
contains a similar set of rules. Canada and most member
countries of the European Union have listed their de-
partments or ministries of health and/or other agencies
with responsibility for pharmaceuticals.
The USMCA Government Procurement Chapter (Ch.
13), which is very similar to the corresponding TPP
chapter, applies only to the USA and Mexico. The US
Department of Health and Human Services is covered,
and pharmaceuticals are not excluded from the scope of
covered goods; but sub-national entities that may be in-
volved in procuring pharmaceuticals in the USA are not
covered. Mexico has listed its Comisión Federal para la
Protección contra Riesgos Sanitarios (Federal Commis-
sion for Protection against Health Risks), and pharma-
ceuticals are not excluded from the scope of coverage.
Mexico has set the threshold for tendering quite low, al-
though procurement contracts up to a certain value can
be set aside for Mexican suppliers.
Exceptions for measures necessary to protect health are
included in each government procurement chapter; how-
ever, the exceptions are subject to the requirement that
measures are not to be applied in an arbitrary or discrim-
inatory manner, or are not a disguised restriction on trade.
Such exceptions may assist Parties in defending a measure
in the case of a dispute, but this is by no means certain.
The effects of opening government procurement of
pharmaceuticals through trade agreements have not
been the subject of published research. Open, competi-
tive tendering may result in lower prices for pharmaceu-
ticals and is one of the strategies recommended by
WHO [61]. However, tendering can, in the longer term,
have negative impacts such as forcing some suppliers
out of the market and reducing competition, potentially
contributing to shortages [61]. Liberalizing government
procurement may also affect the viability of fledgling
generic medicines industries in those countries where
local pharmaceutical companies are dependent, at least
in the short term, on preferential arrangements.
Rules applying to state-owned enterprises and
designated monopolies (SOEs)
Under the relevant chapters on state-owned enterprises
and designated monopolies (TPP/CPTPP Ch. 17, CETA
Ch. 18, and USMCA Ch. 22), states retain the right to
maintain and establish state-owned enterprises and mon-
opolies, but these entities must operate according to cer-
tain rules to ensure that they do not have a competitive
advantage over other firms. CETA defines a state enter-
prise as “an enterprise that is owned or controlled by a
Party” (Ch. 1, Art. 1.1). State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
are defined in TPP Article 17.1 and USMCA Article 22.1
as enterprises “principally engaged in commercial activ-
ities”, in which the government owns more than 50% of
the shares, exercises more than 50% of the voting rights or
has the power to appoint the majority of the board or
management body. This covers SOEs that have mixed
commercial and other purposes, and applies regardless of
whether they actually make a profit. The USMCA defin-
ition is broader, capturing enterprises where the govern-
ment indirectly holds more than 50% of shares, or holds
the power to control the enterprise through another own-
ership enterprise.
A core principle for each of these chapters is that
state-owned enterprises and monopolies, when engaging
in commercial activities, must act in accordance with
commercial considerations (i.e., like a private business)
in the purchase or sale of goods and services,15 and in
ways that do not discriminate against the goods or ser-
vices of another party [62]. These rules restrict preferen-
tial procurement from local producers by SOEs. TPP
Chapter 17 represented a significant development in the
scope and level of detail of provisions for SOEs in trade
agreements [62]. The chapter’s legal rules were retained
in their entirety in the CPTPP.16 The requirements of
the TPP and USMCA are more extensive than those of
CETA, preventing Parties from providing non-
commercial assistance to state-owned enterprises where
this would cause adverse effects to the interests of an-
other Party. “Non-commercial assistance” refers to as-
sistance provided as a result of state ownership or
control, and includes financial assistance (e.g. transfers
of funds, grants, debt forgiveness and loans) and other
forms of favorable treatment, such as shared distribution
networks or R&D support [62]. Article 22.6 of the
USMCA goes even further than the TPP in prohibiting
certain forms of non-commercial assistance altogether.
15There are exceptions for conduct pursuant to a public mandate, but
these are complex and untested.
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These provisions have potential implications for state-
owned pharmaceutical companies in LMICs such as
Vietnam. The Vietnamese domestic pharmaceutical in-
dustry is still in a nascent stage, with most raw materials
imported, and involving (primarily small) local compan-
ies characterized by inefficient processes, low financial
and R&D capacity, and outdated technology [63]. The
Government of Vietnam has introduced a series of pol-
icies aimed at developing the country’s pharmaceutical
industry to the point where it will be able to meet do-
mestic demand [63]. If this is to be achieved, local firms,
including SOEs, are likely to need subsidies and other
types of support in order to become more competitive
[63]. However, the CPTPP SOE rules limit the govern-
ment’s possibilities for providing financial support and
preferential treatment to develop these domestic firms.17
It is important to note, however, that pressure to reform
inefficient SOEs may, under some circumstances, result
in greater competition and lower prices.
Procedural requirements for customs administration and
trade facilitation
All four agreements include chapters concerning the ad-
ministration of customs procedures, focused mainly on
ensuring that customs regulations and procedures are
transparent, predictable, and streamlined, and that they
facilitate the movement of goods across borders. How-
ever, TPP Chapter 5 (Customs Administration and
Trade Facilitation), and the corresponding USMCA
Chapter 7, contain provisions regarding the exchange of
information on customs issues—for example, TPP Art-
icle 5.2.3, which requires Parties to respond to written
requests for information “If a Party has a reasonable sus-
picion of unlawful activity related to its laws or regula-
tions governing importations.” Article 7.21 of the
USMCA goes further, requiring cooperation between the
Parties on border inspections, including the examination
of goods. It is possible that, in the context of TRIPS-Plus
enforcement of intellectual property rights, these provi-
sions may frustrate the movement of generic pharma-
ceuticals across borders in cases where they are
suspected of being counterfeit goods, i.e., goods sus-
pected of violating IP rules rather than being of deliber-
ately inferior quality. However, as these chapters are
clearly intended to facilitate the cross-border movement
of goods, it is also conceivable that cooperation between
the Parties on customs issues and border inspections
may make such seizures less likely, or may facilitate
more rapid resolution.
Rules applying to regulatory practices, cooperation and
coherence
All four agreements include chapters dedicated to what
is variously referred to as “regulatory cooperation”
(CETA Ch. 21), “regulatory coherence” (TPP/CPTPP
Ch. 25), and “good regulatory practices” (USMCA Ch.
28). CETA focuses on cooperation between the Parties
through the creation of a Regulatory Cooperation Forum
(Art. 21.6). The TPP/CPTPP agreements include provi-
sions addressing how regulations are developed at the
domestic level. The TPP Regulatory Coherence Chapter
represented a significant normative development in
terms of embedding these types of provisions in trade
rules [64]; the USMCA has taken this further, with dee-
per, broader and more binding commitments.
The TPP/CPTPP Regulatory Coherence chapter en-
courages Parties to undertake regulatory impact assess-
ments, following specific processes (Art 25.5). They are
encouraged to assess the need for a regulatory proposal,
examine feasible alternatives, explain the grounds for
concluding that the approach selected will achieve the
policy objectives, rely on the best available information,
and provide easy-to-understand publicly accessible infor-
mation. The TPP’s dispute settlement processes do not
apply to this chapter, meaning that one Party cannot
force another to comply.
In contrast, USMCA Chapter 28 contains a far more
prescriptive and detailed set of requirements, with most
provisions couched in binding legal language (each Party
“shall”…), and is also enforceable through the USMCA’s
dispute settlement process, at least for “a sustained or
recurring course of action or inaction that is inconsistent
with a provision of this Chapter” (Art 28.20). The main
concern regarding pharmaceutical policy is that the de-
tailed requirements for developing domestic regulatory
measures may provide the industry with grounds for
complaints (e.g., that the exploration of feasible alterna-
tives, information used in decision-making, and/or infor-
mation provided about the proposed regulatory
measures were inadequate). Furthermore, where expert
advisory groups are used for providing advice to regula-
tory authorities, each Party to the USMCA must “en-
courage its regulatory authorities to ensure that the
membership of any expert group or body includes a
range and diversity of views and interests, as appropriate
to the particular context” (Art 28.10.3), and must en-
deavor to provide “means for interested persons to pro-
vide inputs to the expert groups or bodies” (Art 28.10.5).
16The CPTPP Annex, paragraph 11, suspends certain obligations in the
Annex IV Schedule of Malaysia, but these changes are not relevant to
pharmaceuticals.
17Non-conforming measures included in TPP Annex IV Schedule of
Viet Nam (https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/
Annexes/Annex-IV.-Viet-Nam.pdf) allow Vietnam to continue to
provide some specific types of financial assistance under some
circumstances. Other TPP countries have also used Annex IV to limit
their obligations with respect to SOEs and designated monopolies.
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This may be used to justify industry membership of, or
input to, expert groups and bodies, and serve to frustrate
efforts to avoid conflicts of interest in the development
of pharmaceutical policy.
Finally, all four agreements also include rules in other
chapters (CETA Ch. 27, TPP/CPTPP Ch. 26, USMCA
Ch. 29) that apply to the development of domestic regu-
lations, such as those requiring prompt publication of
proposed laws, regulations, procedures, and administra-
tive rulings, and the provision of “reasonable opportun-
ity” for “interested persons” and other Parties to
comment on such proposals (CETA Art 21.1, TPP/
CPTPP Art 26.2, USMCA Art 29.2). These provisions
add further “red tape” and potential opportunities for in-
dustry influence in policy-making.
Discussion and conclusion
The analysis presented here has indicated the substantial
range of provisions and pathways in need of further ex-
ploration, beyond IP protection as such, with potential
impacts on pharmaceutical policy that extend beyond
the issues of access and affordability. Some of these pro-
visions (such as regulatory requirements for assessing
safety, efficacy, and quality; rules for SOEs and regula-
tory coherence) have appeared in trade agreements only
recently and have been subjected to scant analysis and
little or no empirical research, as they are only beginning
to be adopted and implemented. The analytical frame-
work proposed in Table 1 brings these provisions to-
gether into a comprehensive checklist of provisions,
pathways, and potential impacts.
We envisage that the analytical framework may be
useful as:
 a guide to the types of provisions and potential
impacts that the health and human rights impact
assessments of proposed trade and investment
agreements need to consider, to fully explore the
potential impacts on pharmaceutical policy;
 a checklist for trade negotiators (and their health
advisors) who scrutinize proposed legal texts for
potential issues in need of closer examination, or for
issues that health experts and non-governmental
organizations engaged in advocacy want to put in
focus;
 a template for analysis for countries that are
considering joining existing trade agreements, such
as the CPTPP, to assist them to identify the
implications of an existing set of legal rules for their
own health and pharmaceutical systems; and
 an analytic tool for researchers engaged in tracing
the impacts of specific agreements on
pharmaceutical policy.
Empirical study of the effects of TRIPS-Plus IPRs on
access to medicines is complicated by the long time-
frames before most of these provisions begin to affect
the length of exclusivity and play out in terms of higher
expenditure and prices or reduced access to affordable
medicines [11]. By contrast, the effects of many of the
other provisions analyzed here, while also challenging to
measure empirically, may be observable much earlier.
Attention needs be given to developing methods and
tools for exploring the impact of the full range of
pharmaceutical-relevant provisions now being included
in trade agreements.
It is important to note that the analytic framework
presented here only identifies provisions and pathways
that may have potential impacts, whether positive or
negative. There is considerable variation in the provi-
sions included in different agreements and the specific
legal language employed, including “constructive ambi-
guities” that leave interpretation unclear [65]. The actual
impacts will depend on a myriad of factors which are
specific to the trade agreement in question, the context
in specific countries, and how agreements are inter-
preted through domestic legislation and through dispute
resolution. Further, states can mitigate the impact of
provisions in future trade agreements through careful
negotiation (e.g., through exclusions, exceptions, and
transition periods for implementation), or offset the im-
pacts through compensatory strategies (e.g., price con-
trols for pharmaceuticals).
There is no doubt that future trade agreements will
continue to present a wide range of potential intersec-
tions with pharmaceutical policy which negotiating
countries will need to grapple with in the context of
efforts to achieve SDG 3.8. However, the analysis
presented here indicates that there is not a simple pro-
gression of deepening commitments from one trade
agreement to the next. The suspension of certain IP pro-
visions and the procedural rules for pharmaceutical re-
imbursement programs in the CPTPP could be seen as
signaling a retreat from the more extreme positions
sought by the USA. However, the re-emergence of even
more extreme provisions in the USMCA clearly indi-
cates that the USA, when it holds pivotal negotiating
power, will continue to push for increasingly stringent
IPR provisions.
A final point: the provisions discussed here may have
impacts on the ability of countries to achieve SDG 3.8 by
other pathways in addition to those that affect the four
core pharmaceutical objectives. For example, to the extent
that any of these provisions increase public costs with
little or no improved therapeutic benefit, they become
opportunity costs as regards achieving SDG 3.8. Many of
the provisions impose a considerable administrative bur-
den of compliance on LMICs, with human resource and
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infrastructure implications. As Walls and colleagues point
out, “If states do not find ways to increase their adminis-
trative regulatory capacities in regard to the negotiation,
implementation and on-going management of PTAs [pref-
erential trade agreements], these PTAs will potentially
drive greater health inequities” [66].
Limitations of our study include that the framework is
based solely on the contents of four recently negotiated
trade agreements. Other trade agreements recently nego-
tiated or currently under negotiation may include varia-
tions on the provisions described here, or may contain
new provisions not featured in previous agreements.
What we have presented is an overview of the pathways
and potential impacts for the purpose of developing the
analytic framework, rather than a detailed health impact
assessment of the likely effects of the trade agreements
in specific contexts.
Here we have offered an analytic framework linking
ten types of provisions in regional trade agreements with
potential impacts on four core pharmaceutical policy ob-
jectives, via a range of pathways. It is our hope that this
framework may prove useful for future health and hu-
man rights impact assessment and research into the im-
plications of trade agreements for pharmaceutical policy
and access to medicines.
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